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Abstract
The standard notion of formal theory, in Logic, is in general biased exclusively
towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any
agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be commit-
ted to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical
consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple
levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the
received notion by allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This
novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence opera-
tors, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the
present paper.
Towards a widened notion of theory
When thinking of a logical theory as some collection of judgments closed under a given
notion of consequence, it is often useful to adopt the proof-theoretic frame of mind and
think of a collection of axioms and rules together with the theorems that may be derived
from them, or else to put the glasses of the formal semanticist and look at the collection
of sentences entailed from the initially given collection. A general abstract approach
underlying both proof theory and formal semantics, though, may be undertaken by way
of the theory of consequence operators. In the standard approach promoted by Alfred
Tarski, a theory is nothing but a fixed point of a certain given consequence operator: in
the usual case, one talks about a collection of asserted sentences that contains all other
∗The second author acknowledges that the work was done under the scope of Project UID / EEA / 50008 /
2019 of Instituto de Telecomunicac¸o˜es, financed by the applicable framework (FCT /MEC through national
funds and co-funded by FEDER-PT2020). The third author acknowledges partial funding by CNPq. The
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assertions that may be thought of as ‘following from’ that very collection; dually, one
might also talk about of a collection of denied sentences that contains all other denials
that follow from it.
If one takes for granted that a denial consists simply in the complement of an as-
sertion, as much of the literature on Logic would seem to do (notice though that this
was already put into question as early as in [5]), the local reading of the rule of modus
ponens as constraining one to assert B whenever one commits oneself to asserting both
A-implies-B and A would be equivalent to reading that very rule in the form of modus
tollens, constraining one to denying A whenever one commits to asserting A-implies-B
while denying B. Further, if the proof of an assertion amounts to globally recogniz-
ing its validity, it would seem wrong to understand the counterproof of a denial as
a recognition of its invalidity; the latter, and dual, attitude would rather amount to a
recognition that a denial corresponds to an unsatisfiable judgment. Assuming that un-
satisfiability is the complement of validity would however consist in disposing of what
would arguably constitute the most interesting class of logical sentences, namely that of
contingencies: indeed, only the contingent sentences are really ‘informative’ for the lo-
gician, in the sense that they always make a difference in terms of therewith associated
states of affairs (viz. models), when added to either side of an inferential statement.
Thinking about assertions and denials both as first-class citizens in the activity of
analyzing inferences, by considering theories that are presented by way of both kinds of
judgments, not only allows the above mentioned unexpected asymmetries to be fixed,
but it actually gives one the opportunity to construct strictly more expressive inferen-
tial statements than one would be able to construct using only one of the judgments of
asserting or of denying. Here goes, by way of an informal example, a theory that has
no finite assertion-based presentation, but that does have a finite presentation in terms
of a denial-based presentation. Consider a set L of sentences represented by the natural
numbers and an extra sentence H. Suppose that a formal semantics for the underlying
logic takes H to be false only if n is true for every natural number n, and makes no fur-
ther assumptions. From the inferential viewpoint, as we shall see, this corresponds to
committing to the consecutions written as ∅ ⊲ {n,H}, for every n ∈ IN (the comma on
the right-hand side of the consequence relation symbol ⊲ could of course be eliminated
in the presence of a disjunction in the underlying object-language). Where Γ1, Γ0 ⊆ L,
let’s say that (Γ1, Γ0) presents a theory in which the sentences in Γ1 are taken as as-
serted and those of Γ0 are taken as denied. Then, as the reader will be able to check by
himself after the next couple of sections of the present paper, for every finite Γ ( IN
the ‘closure’ of the purely assertion-based presentation (Γ,∅) is the theory (Γ,∅) itself;
on the other hand, the infinite theory (IN, {H}) is the closure of the purely denial-based
finite presentation (∅, {H}).
The latter example properly fits within the enterprise of investigating abstract con-
sequence relations in terms of a framework often called ‘Set × Set consequence’,
‘symmetric[al] consequence’ or ‘generalized consequence’ (cf. [19, 8, 17, 7, 24, 10,
11], and others), and contrasts with the traditional framework known as ‘Set × Fmla
consequence’, which allows for multiple premises and focuses on a single conclusion
at any given time. For very natural reasons, as we shall see, the investigation of logical
theories containing both assertions and denials, in the present paper, will be based on
the above mentioned generalized notion of consequence.
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We start Section 1 of the present paper by stating the properties of a somewhat
intuitive notion of ‘compatibility relation’ among sets of sentences, taking next the
generalized notion of consequence relation (that we call ‘S-consequence relation’) to
be its complement and the Tarskian-inspired notion of consequence relation (that we
call ‘T-consequence relation’) to impose a structural restriction on S-consequence. We
rephrase then the T-consequence relations in terms of ‘T-consequence operators’, de-
fine the space of all theories associated to T-consequence, and consider some of the nu-
merous possible T-consequence counterparts of a given S-consequence relation. This
section also recalls the meaning of the property of ‘finitariness’ (of which the so-called
‘compactness property’ constitutes the semantic rendering), as applied to the above
mentioned notions. The role of the latter property will be taken into account in later
sections.
Section 2 clarifies how compatibility relations are connected, among other things,
to purely meta-theoretical formulations of the fundamental logical principles of Ex-
cluded Middle and Non-Contradiction. In this section we recall and discuss the Galois
connections that may be established between formal semantics and the notions of com-
patibility and consequence, and we highlight the well-known problem concerning the
failure of ‘absoluteness’, according to which there is in general no one-to-one corre-
spondence between T-consequence relations and the therewith associated collections of
bivaluations. Together with some other illustrations provided in this section (e.g., the
example of a non-finitaryS-consequence relation that induces a finitary T-consequence
relation), the latter expressive shortcoming is used to motivate our present quest for an
adequate generalization of consequence operators and an adequate notion of theory that
fits the bill in the study of S-consequence relations.
In Section 3 we investigate more deeply the class of T-consequence relations and
operators that could be associated to the same given S-consequence relation. To put
it in deductive terms, the main idea here is to consider theories presented in terms of
both axioms and anti-axioms, and to allow one to ask for their associated theorems
and anti-theorems: namely, for a given S-consequence relation ⊲, for each fixed set Γ0
of background denied assumptions we show how to define a T-consequence operator
C
D:Γ0
⊲
, and for each fixed set Γ1 of background asserted assumptions we show how
to define a T-consequence operator C
A:Γ1
⊲
. The latter consequence relations are then
used to explain the behavior of our novel bilateralist notion of S-consequence operator,
according to which the S-closure C2(Γ1, Γ0) of the pair (Γ1, Γ0) is given by the ‘theory-
pair’ (C
D:Γ0
⊲
(Γ1),C
A:Γ1
⊲
(Γ0)). One should observe, in particular, how each component of
the latter notion has its own associated context of judgment: one is to talk accordingly
about the theorems that are concluded ‘modulo a set of denials’, and about the anti-
theorems that are concluded ‘modulo a set of assertions’.
To the best of our knowledge, all other extant notions of theory-pair proposed in
the literature are based on partitions of the whole set of sentences into those that are
asserted and those that are denied. This corresponds in fact to (consistent and) com-
plete, or maximal theories, and an appropriate adequate semantics may be associated
to the latter, for any given logic. However, as we argue in this paper, there is no real-
istic reason why theories should be so ‘fully informative’: in general theories need not
divide all sentences into those belonging to the class of theorems and those belonging
to the class of anti-theorems. At last, in Section 4, we proceed to show how the above
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mentioned notion of S-closure may accordingly be used to provide a novel notion of
theory (as a fixed point of C2) that takes both assertions and denials on an equal foot-
ing, and that allows us to investigate the associated spaces of theories. We finish the
paper by generalizing a well-known result that identifies the property of the space of
theories that corresponds to finitariness of consequence.
Historical digression. The terminology introduced by Tarski in [20] —and used in
fact by most of the subsequent Polish literature on the study of logical calculi— for the
fixed points of a given closure operator C was that of deductive system or, frequently
and more specifically, (closed) C-system. Much later on (cf. [23]), logical theories
were to be identified with collections of said deductive systems that happened to be
closed under substitutions (cf. [12]). Tarski’s initial aim was that of studying in abstract
the fundamental properties and underlying concepts of Hilbert’s axiomatic method in
metamathematics (to which Tarski referred as ‘the methodology of the deductive sci-
ences’). Such abstract —and axiomatic— approach to consequence aimed thus at gen-
eralizing the concrete approach to the (proof-theoretical) formalization of mathematical
theories based on collections of inference rules of a certain format, the closure under
which would suffice to turn a given collection of assertions into the theory thereby in-
duced. Some time later, however, Tarski claimed that there was a mismatch between
the proof-theoretical approach and the ‘common concept of consequence’ (cf. [21]),
namely, the one that was to be captured by ‘scientific semantics’ —a programme in-
spired by Carnap’s early model theory. Accordingly, Tarski explicitly formulated then
the truth-preserving concept of consequence which is the one nowadays canonically
associated with T-consequence relations. It is worth noting that no connection was
established at the time between sets of (object-level) axioms and classes of models;
general results concerning the adequacy of the semantical notion of consequence to the
abstract notion of consequence were unheard of in this early period.
We also note, as an aside, that the now standard notion of ‘T-consequence’ is not
the one that was originally entertained in [20], for Tarski always took finitariness for
granted, as an integral part of his axiomatization of consequence operators. Non-
finitary consequence operators, indeed, were to become the standard only much later
(cf. [12]). A similar misattribution that persists in the literature concerns the notion of
‘S-consequence’, which was not entertained by Scott in [18], where a structural restric-
tion on the cardinality of the consecutions was imposed to the effect that, once more,
only finitary logics happened to be considered. The study of (non-finitary) generalized
consequence relations, in the sense invoked here in talking about ‘S-consequence’,
properly started with [19].
1 Capturing the notion of logical consequence
Let L be a non-empty set of sentences. We will assume that the judgments of assertion
and denial are primitive in our metalanguage, and in what follows we will intuitively
think of the consecution (∆1,∆0) as a meta-logical expression concerning the ‘compat-
ibility’ of certain judgments, namely, the assertion of all sentences in ∆1 ⊆ L and the
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denial of all sentences in ∆0 ⊆ L. Building on that idea, a (canonical logical) compati-
bility relation (on L) will be here defined as any relation ◮ on ℘(L) × ℘(L) satisfying,
for every Π,Π′,Σ,Σ′,∆ ⊆ L:
(CM0) if Π′ ∪ Π ◮ Σ ∪ Σ′, then Π ◮ Σ
(CM1) if Π ◮ Σ, then Π ∩ Σ = ∅
(CM2) if Π ◮ Σ, then there is some ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that ∆′ ∪ Π ◮ Σ ∪ (∆ \ ∆′)
The reading of (CM0) is immediate: in any state of affairs in which a certain set of
sentences ∆1 = Π
′ ∪ Π is asserted while a certain set of sentences ∆0 = Σ ∪ Σ
′ is
denied, one may in particular say that all subsets of ∆1 are asserted and that all subsets
of ∆0 are denied. Furthermore, on the one hand, taking Π = Σ = {A}, property (CM1)
says that the sentence A may not be simultaneously asserted and denied; on the other
hand, taking ∆ = {A}, property (CM2) says that the sentence A must be either asserted
or denied (in a context where the sentences in Π are asserted and those in Σ are denied).
One might say thus that (CM1) provides a meta-logical formulation of the ‘Principle
of Non-Contradiction’, and disallows for glutty states of affairs in which a sentence is
simultaneously asserted and denied: In any given (consistent) state of affairs, asserting
a given sentence A should not be compatible with denying it. Dually, one might say
that (CM2) provides a meta-logical formulation of the ‘Principle of Excluded Middle’,
and disallows for gappy states of affairs in which a sentence is neither asserted nor
denied: In no state of affairs can a sentence A fail to be either asserted or denied.
The complement ⊲ of a compatibility relation ◮ on ℘(L)×℘(L) will here be called
an S-consequence relation (on L). It should be clear that it satisfies the following
properties, for every Π,Π′,Σ,Σ′,∆ ⊆ L:
(CRS0) if Π ⊲ Σ, then Π
′ ∪ Π ⊲ Σ ∪ Σ′
(CRS1) if Π ∩ Σ , ∅, then Π ⊲ Σ
(CRS2) if ∆
′ ∪ Π ⊲ Σ ∪ (∆ \ ∆′) for every ∆′ ⊆ ∆, then Π ⊲ Σ
Examples of S-consequence relations abound in the literature, but many logicians seem
still not to be so familiar with them—or even resist to them without justifications based
on anything but misunderstandings about what they mean and how they behave at the
meta-logical level.
If one constrains an S-consequence relation into a relation on ℘(L)×L, one will be
said to define a T-consequence relation (on L). Note that a T-consequence relation ⊲
satisfies the following properties, for every Π,Π′,∆ ⊆ L and every A ∈ L:
(CRT0) if Π ⊲ A, then Π
′ ∪ Π ⊲ A
(CRT1) if A ∈ Π, then Π ⊲ A
(CRT2) if ∆ ∪Π ⊲ A and Π ⊲ δ for every δ ∈ ∆, then Π ⊲ A
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In what follows, whenever we need to disambiguate between the symbols for S-con-
sequence and for T-consequence, we shall write, respectively, ⊲S and ⊲T. For a se-
mantically-inspired analogy, one might think of the opposition between the notions
of ‘compatibility’ and ‘consequence’ as reflecting the (dual) opposition between the
notions of ‘satisfiability’ and ‘validity’.
An alternative way of describing T-consequence relations may be procured by way
of a generalization of Kuratowski’s axioms on topological closure, namely by omitting
the axioms according to which C(∅) = ∅ and C(∆∪∆′) = C(∆)∪C(∆′). A consequence
operator (on L) is a closure operator on the partially ordered structure 〈℘(L),⊆〉, that
is, a mapping C : ℘(L) −→ ℘(L) that satisfies, for every Γ,∆ ⊆ L:
(COT0) C(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ ∪ ∆)
(COT1) Γ ⊆ C(Γ)
(COT2) C(C(Γ)) ⊆ C(Γ)
Indeed, a T-consequence relation ⊲ on L induces a consequence operator C⊲ on L
by simply setting C⊲(Γ) = {A ∈ L : Γ ⊲ A}, and a consequence operator C on L
induces a T-consequence relation ⊲C on L by setting Π ⊲C A iff A ∈ C(Π). Choosing
to work with T-consequence relations or with consequence operators is often just a
matter of convenience, given that ⊲C⊲= ⊲ and C⊲C = C. It is well known that the set
of all T-consequence operators on L equipped with the inclusion ordering constitutes a
complete lattice, to which we shall refer as COLT(L).
Given a consequence operator C on L, it is clear from (COT1) and (COT2) that any
set of sentences of the form C(Γ) is a fixpoint for C. Consider in what follows a T-
consequence relation ⊲T on L and a set Γ ⊆ L of axioms. We call C
⊲
T(Γ) the ⊲T-theory
axiomatized by Γ. The elements of C
⊲
T(Γ) are dubbed its theorems. We may think of
a ⊲T-theory as the collection of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating
axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. A set of sentences Γ is called
⊲
T-consistent if C
⊲
T(Γ) , L. We will use Th(⊲T) = {C
⊲
T (Γ) : Γ ⊆ L} to refer to the
space of all ⊲T-theories. It is well known that Th(⊲T) equipped with the inclusion
ordering constitutes a complete lattice. One of our main aims in the present paper is
to propose a notion of theory that is appropriate for S-consequence relations, taking
both assertions and denials on an equal footing, and study the corresponding spaces of
‘⊲S-theories’.
An S-consequence relation ⊲S on L induces an assertion-based T-consequence re-
lation ⊲T
⊲
S
on L by setting Π ⊲T
⊲
S
A iff Π ⊲S {A}, that is, ⊲T
⊲
S
consists in the restriction
of ⊲S to a singleton on the right-hand side. Clearly, such ⊲T
⊲
S
induces a correspond-
ing space of theories, as explained above. As it should be expected, a T-consequence
relation might have several S-consequence ‘counterparts’. This phenomenon will be
discussed in more detail in the next section. We will see there, in particular, that a min-
imum such counterpart always exists, but a maximum counterpart might not exist. It is
worth exploring the symmetry of the logical compatibility relation by observing that an
S-consequence relation ⊲S on L also induces a denial-based T-consequence relation
⊲
S⊲
T on L by setting Σ
⊲
S⊲
T A iff {A} ⊲S Σ. The above mentioned assertion-based
and denial-based T-consequence relations may be taken as representing two different
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‘aspects’ of the given S-consequence relation that induces them; it should be noted
anyhow that the latter relation contains much more information, and it is not possible
in general to recover it solely from these two specific aspects.
The next property to be considered is intended to guarantee that the compatibility
of certain collections of judgments may be transferred from the (finite) local level to
the (unrestrained) global level. A logical compatibility relation ◮ on L is called finitary
if it satisfies the following property, for every Π,Σ ⊆ L:
(CMF) if Π′ ◮ Σ′ for every finite Π′ ⊆ Π and Σ′ ⊆ Σ, then Π ◮ Σ
The diverse practical incarnations of this property often turn out to be equivalent to
the Axiom of Choice. Translated into the contexts of S-consequence relations, T-
consequence relations, and consequence operators, respectively, finitariness may be
expressed by the following statements:
(CRSF) if Π ⊲ Σ, then Π
′
⊲ Σ′ for some finite Π′ ⊆ Π and Σ′ ⊆ Σ
(CRTF) if Π ⊲ A, then Π
′
⊲ A for some finite Π′ ⊆ Π
(COTF) C(Γ) ⊆
⋃
finite ∆⊆ Γ
C(∆)
In the concrete study of logics, finitariness is a very common property, enjoyed for
instance by any logic axiomatized by finitary means or characterized by finite-valued
matrices. It is straightforward to check that the T-consequence relation ⊲C is finitary
if and only if the consequence operator C is finitary. Furthermore, for finitary conse-
quence relations the properties (CM2), (CRS2) and (CRT2) may clearly be simplified
into the corresponding formulations in which the therein mentioned set ∆ is a singleton.
It is not hard to check that the collection of all compatibility relations on L equipped
with the standard inclusion ordering constitutes a complete lattice, to which we shall
refer as CML(L). Obviously, the collection of all S-consequence relations on L also
constitutes a complete lattice under inclusion, and the same may actually be said also
about the collection of all T-consequence relations on L. In what follows, whenever we
need to disambiguate between the two lattices of consequence relations, we will refer
to the former as CRLS(L) and refer to the latter as CRLT(L). Notice, in addition, that
the collections of finitary consequence relations on a given set of sentences also form
lattices under inclusion.
2 Interlude on (bi)valuations
One way of actualizing the intuition that compatibility relations deal indeed with as-
sertions and denials is by way of (bi)valuation semantics. Let a (bi)valuation on L be a
relation ν on L× {0, 1}. We shall use 1ν to refer to the asserting aspect of ν, namely the
set {A ∈ L : (A, 1) ∈ ν}, and use its complement 0ν to refer to the denying aspect of ν,
namely the set {A ∈ L : (A, 0) ∈ ν}. A valuation ν on L is said to determine a binary
relation Rν on ℘(L) defined by setting Π Rν Σ to hold iff Π ⊆ 1ν and Σ ⊆ 0ν. It should
be clear that such Rν always satisfies the property (CM0), that Rν satisfies the property
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(CM1) iff ν is functional (a.k.a. right-unique), and that Rν satisfies the property (CM2)
iff ν is surjective (a.k.a. right-total). Accordingly, we shall call canonical valuation
on L any total function ν : L −→ {0, 1}, and define a canonical semantics on L to
be a collection of canonical valuations on L. In case we are dealing with a canonical
valuation ν, we will accordingly write ◮ν rather than Rν. As usual, by {0, 1}
L we de-
note the set of all canonical valuations on L. The collection ℘({0, 1}L) of all canonical
semantics on L equipped with the standard inclusion ordering constitutes a complete
lattice, to which we shall refer as SML(L). A canonical semantics V ⊆ {0, 1}L is said to
determine a compatibility relation ◮V :=
⋃
ν ∈V ◮ν on L. Obviously, the complement
of such compatibility relations constitute S-consequence relations, and so we may also
say that any canonical valuation or semantics determines the associated S-consequence
and T-consequence relations ⊲S
V
and ⊲T
V
. It is easy to check that ⊲T
⊲
S
V
= ⊲T
V
, for any
canonical semantics V, that is, the T-consequence relation determined by V coincides
with the T-consequence relation induced by the S-consequence relation determined
by V. In addition, given a compatibility relation ◮ on ℘(L) and a canonical valua-
tion ν on L, we shall say that ν respects ◮ if ◮ν ⊆ ◮; given a consequence relation ⊲
on ℘(L) and a canonical valuation ν on L, we shall say that ν respects ⊲ if ⊲ ⊆ ⊲ν. We
shall denote by VR the ‘respectful’ semantics defined by the collection of all canoni-
cal valuations on L that respect R, where R denotes either a compatibility relation or a
consequence relation.
It is worth noting that the above mappings that associate to each canonical seman-
tics V a compatibility relation ◮V determined by it and that associate to each compabil-
ity relation◮ a respectful canonical semantics V◮ define amonotone Galois connection
between the lattice CML(L) of all compatibility relations on L and the lattice SML(L)
of all canonical semantics on L, that is, ◮V ⊆ ◮ iff V ⊆ V◮, for every ◮ ∈ CML(L) and
every V ∈ SML(L). Analogously, an antitone Galois connection is defined between
CRL(L) and SML(L), that is, ⊲ ⊆ ⊲V iff V ⊆ V⊲, for every ⊲ ∈ CRL(L) and every
V ∈ SML(L). From this it immediately follows that: (G1) V ⊆ VRV , for R ∈ {◮,⊲};
(G2) ◮V◮ ⊆ ◮; (G3) ⊲ ⊆ ⊲V⊲ . Furthermore, given that any consequence relation is de-
termined by the collection of all canonical valuations that respect it —in other words,
given that the latter collection of canonical valuations constitutes a complete semantics
for the corresponding consequence relation—, the converse of (G3) also holds good;
the converse of (G2) is seen to hold good, of course, as a corollary to that.
The property corresponding to the converse of (G1) is called absoluteness, and it
constitutes the analogue, for a logical theory, of the model-theoretic notion of ‘cate-
goricity’. When it holds good, it guarantees that every compatibility / consequence
relation is associated to a unique canonical semantics. Consider the various particular
formulations for absoluteness, namely: (G1◮) V ⊇ V◮V ; (G1
S
⊲
) V ⊇ V
⊲
S
V
; and (G1T
⊲
)
V ⊇ V
⊲
T
V
. On the one hand, it is easy to see that (G1◮) always holds good. Indeed, sup-
pose that the canonical valuation ν respects ◮V, that is, suppose that ◮ν ⊆ ◮V. Given
that obviously 1ν ◮ν 0ν, we conclude that 1ν ◮ν⋆ 0ν for some ν
⋆ ∈ V. This means
that ν⋆(A) = ν(A) for every A ∈ L, and so ν ∈ V. On the other hand, there is an
essential difference in behavior between T-consequence relations and S-consequence
relations on what concerns absoluteness, namely: (G1S
⊲
) always holds good, as a corol-
lary to (G1◮), yet (G1T
⊲
) in general fails. As a matter of fact, it is not hard to identify
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the reason for the failure of (G1T
⊲
). Where {νk}k∈K is a family of canonical valuations
on L, define its conjunctive combination as the canonical valuation
[⋂
k∈K νk
]
such that[⋂
k∈K νk
]
(A) = 1 if νk(A) = 1 for every k ∈ K, and
[⋂
k∈K νk
]
(A) = 0 otherwise. Note
first that 1[
⋂
k∈K νk] =
⋂
k∈K 1νk . Next, for every T-consequence relation ⊲
T, note that the
semantics V
⊲
T is closed under conjunctive combinations. Indeed, given {νk}k∈K ⊆ V⊲T ,
and assuming that Π ⊲T A and that Π ⊆ 1[
⋂
k∈K νk], it follows that Π ⊆ 1νk and hence
A ∈ 1νk for every k ∈ K. Thus, A ∈
⋂
k∈K 1νk = 1[
⋂
k∈K νk], and we conclude that[⋂
k∈K νk
]
∈ V
⊲
T . Nonetheless, it should be clear that not every semantics V is closed
under conjunctive combinations1, and any witness to such phenomenon will constitute
an actual counterexample to (G1T
⊲
). As a matter of fact, all counterexamples have this
exact form: If one lets V∩ denote the least superset of V that is closed under conjunctive
combinations, one may prove that V
⊲
T
V
= V∩. To see that, notice that every v ∈ V⊲T
V
is
an intersection of canonical valuations in V: For each A < 1v one may say that 1v ◮v A
and so there exists vA ∈ V such that 1v ◮vA A, that is, 1v ⊆ 1vA and A < 1vA ; clearly,
v =
⋂
A <1v
vA.
The absoluteness of compatibility relations and of S-consequence relations guar-
antees that CML(L) and CRLS(L) inherit from SML(L) the structure of a complete
Boolean algebra (under the obvious inclusion ordering). In contrast, the complete lat-
tice CRLT(L) fails absoluteness and in fact fails to be distributive, in general. Failing
absoluteness, a T-consequence relation may happen to be determined by two distinct
semantics. All that we can guarantee is that ⊲T
V
= ⊲T
V′
if and only if V∩ = V
′
∩. However,
if V∩ = V
′
∩ yet V , V
′, then we still have ⊲S
V
, ⊲
S
V′
in spite of ⊲T
V
= ⊲T
V′
. This means
that an assertion-based T-consequence relation ⊲T may boast distinct S-consequence
relations as its ‘counterparts’, namely, there will in general exist2 relations ⊲S
1
, ⊲
S
2
such that ⊲T
⊲
S
1
= ⊲T
⊲
S
2
(an analogous observation may be formulated, of course, concern-
ing denial-based T-consequence relations and their multiple possible ‘counterparts’ in
terms of S-consequence). That phenomenon suggests that one should associate to S-
consequence relations a space of theories that has a richer structure than the space of
theories of the T-consequence relations induced by the former relations. Studying the
spaces of ‘⊲S-theories’ is indeed one of our main goals in the present paper.
Delving a bit deeper, we may note that a T-consequence relation ⊲T always has a
minimum (generalized) counterpart⊲S
⊲
T
[min] characterized by setting (Π,Σ) ∈ ⊲S
⊲
T
[min]
iff Π ⊲T A for some A ∈ Σ. It is easy to see that ⊲S
⊲
T
[min] corresponds to the largest
possible set of canonical valuations that respect ⊲T, that is, ⊲S
⊲
T
[min] = ⊲S
V
⊲
T
. To that
effect it suffices to check that Π ⊲S
V∩
Σ if and only if Π ⊲T
V
A for some A ∈ Σ. In con-
trast, a maximum generalized counterpart for a T-consequence relation⊲may not exist.
Indeed, in general, there may not exist a minimal set of canonical valuations V such
that V∩ = Val(⊲
T). Such a minimal set of canonical valuations, and the corresponding
maximum (generalized) counterpart ⊲S
⊲
T
[max] for a given T-consequence relation ⊲T
1Consider for instance a set of sentences L = {p, q}, and a semantics containing only two canonical
valuations, νp and νq, such that νx(y) = 1 iff x = y. (This sort of problems related to the failure of absoluteness
has been discussed as early as in [3].)
2For a straightforward class of examples (cf. [14]), let ν⊤ denote the the ‘dadaistic’ valuation on L such
that 1ν⊤ = L, consider a semantics V such that ν⊤ < V, and let V
⋆ := V ∪ {ν⊤ }. Then ⊲
T
V
= ⊲T
V⋆
, and
L ⊲
S
V
∅, while L ◮V⋆ ∅.
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may be shown to exist, in particular, whenever ⊲T happens to be finitary. Indeed, in
this case one may use the Lindenbaum-Asser lemma: When it exists, the minimal set of
canonical valuations corresponds precisely to the so-called relatively maximal theories
of ⊲T, that is, it consists in the set of all canonical valuations ν such that 1ν ∈ Th(⊲
T)
and such that A ∈ C
⊲
T(Γ) for some sentence A < 1ν and for every Γ such that 1ν ( Γ.
Given a canonical semantics V ⊆ {0, 1}L, and using CV to denote C⊲T
V
, it is easy to see
that:
CV(Γ) =
⋂
ν ∈V such that 1ν ⊇ Γ
1ν. (⋆)
For a simple illustration involvingS-consequence, consider first the T-consequence
relation ⊲T
CPL
of classical propositional logic, determined by the set of all Boolean
valuations. On the one hand, its maximum counterpart consists precisely in the S-
consequence relation ⊲S
CPL
determined by the set of all Boolean valuations; on the
other hand, its minimum counterpart, determined by the closure for conjunctive com-
binations of the set of all Boolean valuations, seems to be of much lesser interest. In
particular, when we consider the disjunction connective,∨, we see that the consecution
({A ∨ B}, {A, B}) belongs to the maximum counterpart of ⊲T
CPL
, intuitively saying thus
that one cannot simultaneously deny both sentences A and B without also denying the
sentence A∨ B, but it clearly does not belong to the minimum counterpart of ⊲T
CPL
. On
what concerns maximum counterparts, considering now in more detail the implication
connective, →, let P be a denumerable set of variables and let L be the least set with
P ⊆ L and such that if A, B ∈ L then A → B ∈ L. The maximum counterpart in
this language of the classical T-consequence relation is the S-consequence relation ⊲V
where ν(A → B) = 0 if and only if ν(A) = 1 and ν(B) = 0, for every A, B ∈ L and every
ν ∈ V; it is indeed not difficult to check that it actually consists in the least consequence
relation ⊲S such that:
{A, A→ B} ⊲S {B} and {B} ⊲S {A → B} and ∅ ⊲S {A, A→ B}.
While the first of the latter three statements, which concerns the consecution ({A, A →
B}, {B}), intuitively says that one cannot simultaneously assert A and deny B while also
asserting A → B, the second statement says that one cannot assert B while denying
A → B, and the third one says that one cannot deny A while also denying A → B.
So, according to what we wrote at the beginning of the present section, when assertion
is represented by the truth-value 1 and denial is represented by the truth-value 0, the
three statements above obviously describe, as expected, the well-known truth-function
for classical implication.
For an interesting non-classical illustration, is worth noting that if one considers
instead the consequence relation ⊲T
IPL
of intuitionistic propositional logic, it is known
that its maximum counterpart is determined by the bivaluations defined through the
usual Kripke (topological) semantics, while its minimum counterpart is determined by
the valuations defined through the so-called Beth interpretation (check [8], ch.2 & 3).
Our final case study in this section aims at reinforcing the importance of looking for
an adequate notion of consequence operator and an adequate notion of theory to deal
with S-consequence relations; it involves a simple non-finitary S-consequence relation
that induces a finitary assertion-based T-consequence relation. Take L = IN ∪ {∃},
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let ν∃ be the canonical valuation such that 1ν∃ = {∃}, and consider ⊲
S
V
determined by
V = {0, 1}L \ {ν∃}. It is not difficult to check that ⊲
S
V
is the least consequence relation ⊲
such that {∃} ⊲ IN; note that such ⊲ is not finitary, because {∃} ◮ Ψ for each finite
Ψ ⊆ IN (one may check that the latter consecution holds good by considering the
canonical valuation νΨ ∈ V such that 1νΨ = {∃} ∪ (IN \ Ψ)). However, the consequence
relation ⊲T
⊲
S
V
is finitary (and actually constitutes the minimal T-consequence relation
definable on L); indeed, Γ ⊲T
⊲
S
V
A if and only if A ∈ Γ, for every Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L (and this
is confirmed by noticing that ν∃ ∈ V∩, namely because ν∃ =
⋂
n∈ IN
v{n}). Do note, by the
way, that the consecution {∃} ⊲ IN has a clear ‘denial-based reading’, namely: ν(∃) = 0
whenever ν(IN) = {0}.
A well-known result about consequence relations (cf. Theorem 1.3.5 of [23]) states
that a T-consequence relation ⊲ is finitary precisely when Th(⊲) is closed under ultra-
products. We will explore this topic in more detail later, in Section 4, on what concerns
S-consequence and the associated notion of theory-pair that we will introduce there.
One may already observe, nonetheless, that the last illustration above shows that the
mentioned result does not carry over to S-consequence relations by considering only
the space Th(⊲T
⊲
S
) of induced ⊲T-theories, given that the latter space is closed under
ultraproducts, in spite of the fact that the associated S-consequence relation ⊲S, is
non-finitary. With its bias towards assertion, we see that T-consequence relations can
only furnish thus a partial —though sometimes convenient— view of the more gener-
ous logical phenomenon captured by the more symmetrical notion of S-consequence,
which allows for a more balanced take on assertion and denial.
3 Generalizing consequence operators
In this section we will take action concerning the shortcomings of T-consequence
pointed out in Section 2 and investigate a definition of consequence operator that prop-
erly fits the more symmetric notion of consequence relation given by S-consequence
which arises as a natural dual to the notion of logical compatibility explored in Sec-
tion 1. We want to be able thus to account for a notion of logical theory that is simulta-
neously based both on a set of primitively asserted sentences and on a set of primitively
denied sentences. Recall from Section 1 that the received notion of consequence op-
erator, satisfying properties (COT0), (COT1) and (COT2), was closely associated to T-
consequence: in fact, the lattices CRLT(L) and COLT(L) are dually isomorphic. On our
quest to find a notion of consequence operator naturally associated to S-consequence,
it will be convenient from now on to distinguish among two types of consequence oper-
ators, the former one that we will henceforth rechristen ‘T-consequence operator’, and
a novel one that will be referred to below as C2 and will be dubbed an ‘S-consequence
operator’.
Consider in what follows an S-consequence relation ⊲S on L and let Γ1, Γ0 ⊆ L be
distinguished sets of sentences of L, respectively taken as axioms and anti-axioms of a
certain logical theory. Fixed in the background any set Σ of sentences taken by assump-
tion to be denied, let CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ1) denote the set containing every sentence A ∈ L such that
Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A}; fixed in the background any set Π of sentences taken by assumption
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to be asserted, let CA:Π
⊲
S
(Γ0) denote the set containing every sentence A ∈ L such that
{A} ∪Π ⊲S Γ0. The elements of C
D:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ1) might be thought of as the sentences that one
is committed to assert once the sentences in Γ1 are all asserted, in the context of the
denial of all the sentences in Σ; or informally as the theorems of the theory axiomatized
by Γ1 modulo the denied sentences of Σ. Analogously, the elements of C
A:Π
⊲
S
(Γ0) might
be thought of as the sentences that one is committed to deny once the sentences in Γ0
are all denied, in the context of the assertion of all the sentences in Σ; or informally as
the anti-theorems of the theory anti-axiomatized by Γ0 modulo the asserted sentences
of Π. When the background context of judgment contains neither sentences to be taken
by assumption as asserted nor sentences to be taken by assumption as denied, it should
be clear, in particular, that CD:∅
⊲
S
and CA:∅
⊲
S
describe, respectively, the assertion-based and
the denial-based T-consequence operators associated to ⊲S, introduced in Section 1.
From now on, for every ∆ ⊆ L, we will use ∆ to refer to L \ ∆. Moreover, we
will write (Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ (Γ
′
1
, Γ′
0
) instead of both Γ1 ⊆ Γ
′
1
and Γ0 ⊆ Γ
′
0
, and given a fam-
ily {(Πi,Σi)}i∈I ⊆ ℘(L) × ℘(L) of consecutions, we will write
⋂
i∈I(Πi,Σi) instead of
(
⋂
i∈I Πi,
⋂
i∈I Σi). The following result collects some fundamental properties of the op-
erators associated to a givenS-consequence relation according to the above definitions:
Proposition 3.1. Let ⊲S be an S-consequence relation on L, and let Π,Σ ⊆ L. Then,
we have:
(1) CD:Σ
⊲
S
and CA:Π
⊲
S
are T-consequence operators on L .
(2) If Σ ⊆ Σ′ then CD:Σ
⊲
S
⊆ CD:Σ
′
⊲
S
, and if Π ⊆ Π′ then CA:Π
⊲
S
⊆ CA:Π
′
⊲
S
.
(3) For each Ω ⊆ L, either both CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = Ω and CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = Ω ,
or else CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = L .
(4) CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) =
⋂
Ω⊆L such that (Ω,Ω)⊇ (Π,Σ)
CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) and
CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ) =
⋂
Ω⊆L such that (Ω,Ω)⊇ (Π,Σ)
CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) .
(5) If CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ) = Σ′, then CD:Σ
⊲
S
= CD:Σ
′
⊲
S
, and if CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) = Π′, then CA:Π
⊲
S
= CA:Π
′
⊲
S
.
(6) If CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) ∩ CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ) , ∅, then CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) = CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ) = L .
Proof. We prove each of the listed properties, in turn:
(1) We show that CD:Σ
⊲
S
is a T-consequence operator. The proof for CA:Π
⊲
S
is analogous.
(COT0) If Γ1 ⊆ Γ
′
1
and Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A}, then Γ′
1
⊲
S Σ ∪ {A} follows from (CRS0),
thus CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ1) ⊆ C
D:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ′
1
).
(COT1) If A ∈ Γ1 then Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A} follows from (CRS1), for any Σ ⊆ L, and
thus A ∈ CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ1).
(COT2) Let T1 := C
D:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ1), and suppose A ∈ C
D:Σ
⊲
S
(T1). We want to show that
A ∈ T1. By assumption, we have that T1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A}. By definition, it is also
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the case that Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {B} for each B ∈ T1. Take an arbitrary Ω ⊆ L. If either
Γ1 ∩ Ω , ∅ or Σ ∩ Ω , ∅ or A ∈ Ω, then Ω ∪ Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A} ∪ Ω follows from
(CRS2). If, on the contrary, Γ1 ∩ Ω = ∅ and Σ ∩ Ω = ∅ and A < Ω, then either
T1 ⊆ Ω and so Ω∪Γ1 ⊲
S Σ∪ {A} ∪Ω follows by (CRS0) from T1 ⊲
S Σ∪ {A}, or
there exists a B ∈ T1 such that B ∈ Ω and so Ω ∪ Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A} ∪ Ω follows by
(CRS0) from Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {B}. Thus, using (CRS2) with ∆ = L, we may conclude
that Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A}, and so A ∈ CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ1) = T1.
(2) If Σ ⊆ Σ′ and Γ1 ⊲
S A,Σ, then Γ1 ⊲ A,Σ
′ follows from (CRS0). The proof of the
other assertion is analogous.
(3) Let Ω ⊆ L. If Ω ⊲S Ω then Ω ⊲S Ω ∪ {A} and {A} ∪ Ω ⊲S Ω for every A ∈ L,
using (CRS0), so C
D:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = L. Otherwise, let Ω ◮ Ω, where ◮
denotes the complement of ⊲S. This would immediately imply, in particular,
that Ω ◮ Ω ∪ {A} for every A ∈ Ω. This means that Ω ∩ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = ∅. But we
also know that Ω ⊆ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω), in view of (COT1), proved in item (1) above. It
thus follows that CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = Ω. A similar argument may be used to show that in
such a situation we also have CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = Ω.
(4) We prove the first assertion; the second one is proved analogously. On the one
hand, it should be clear that CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) ⊆
⋂
Ω⊆L such that (Ω,Ω)⊇ (Π,Σ)
CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω). Indeed,
for any Ω ⊆ L such that (Π,Σ) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) we conclude from items (1) and (2)
above that CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) ⊆ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω). For the converse inclusion, suppose that (Π,Σ) ⊆
(Ω,Ω) implies A ∈ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω), and consider an arbitrary Ω ⊆ L. So, in case we do
have (Π,Σ) ⊆ (Ω,Ω), it obviously follows thatΩ∪Π ⊲S Σ∪{A}∪Ω. Otherwise,
it must the case that Π ∩ Ω , ∅ or Σ ∩ Ω , ∅, and in either situation (CRS1)
gives us Ω ∪ Π ⊲S Σ ∪ {A} ∪ Ω. We may now invoke (CRS2) to conclude that
Π ⊲S Σ ∪ {A}, that is, A ∈ CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π).
(5) Again, we check the first assertion in detail; the second one is analogous. Half
of the proof is straightforward: Given that Σ ⊆ CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ) = Σ′, in view of item (1)
above, we conclude from item (2) above that CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) ⊆ CD:Σ
′
⊲
S
. For the converse
inclusion, in view of item (4) above, we need to show that if [a] A ∈ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω)
whenever (Π,CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ)) ⊆ (Ω,Ω), then [b] A ∈ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) whenever (Π,Σ) ⊆
(Ω,Ω). So, assume [a] and let Ω ⊆ L be such that (Π,Σ) ⊆ (Ω,Ω). From
the item (3) above we know that either [c] CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = Ω or [d] CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = L.
In case [c], given that (Π,Σ) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) we know from items (1) and (2) that
CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ) ⊆ CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = Ω, and from [a] we conclude that A ∈ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω). In case
[d], it is clear that A ∈ CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) = L.
(6) Let Π′ := CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) and Σ′ := CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ). We are assuming that Π′ ∩ Σ′ , ∅. Using
items (1), (5) and (4) above we may infer that Π′ = CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π) = CD:Σ
⊲
S
(CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Π)) =
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CD:Σ
′
⊲
S
(Π′) =
⋂
Ω⊆L such that (Ω,Ω)⊇ (Π′ ,Σ′)
CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω). Given the assumption thatΠ′∩Σ′ ,
∅, we see that in the latter chain of equalities we are talking about the intersection
of an empty family of elements of ℘(L), from what we conclude that Π′ = L.
The proof that Σ′ = L is analogous. 
The above result shows that there is in fact a plethora of T-consequence operators
that could be associated to a single given S-consequence relation, and such operators
may be collectively organized into a rich structure, being in particular monotonic with
respect to the underlying contextual background of assumptions constituted by certain
primitively asserted / denied sentences. In reading the above properties, it is worth not-
ing that the mentioned operators are completely determined by CD:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω) and CA:Ω
⊲
S
(Ω),
for Ω ⊆ L. The properties also suggest that the sets of axioms and anti-axioms that
originate consistent ‘generalized theories’ manage to separate in between theorems
and anti-theorems, as further discussed in Section 4. Before building upon these prop-
erties, though, in proposing a full generalization of T-consequence operators, we shall
also analyze the situation concerning finitariness.
Proposition 3.2. Let ⊲S be an S-consequence relation on L. Then, ⊲S is finitary if and
only if the following two properties hold for every Π,Σ ⊆ L:
[A] CD:Σ
⊲
S
and CA:Π
⊲
S
are finitary
[B] CD:Σ
⊲
S
=
⋃
finite Σ⋆⊆Σ
CD:Σ
⋆
⊲
S
and CA:Π
⊲
S
=
⋃
finite Π⋆⊆Π
CA:Π
⋆
⊲
S
Proof. First, assume that ⊲S is finitary. We prove that [A′] CD:Σ
⊲
S
is finitary and [B′]
CD:Σ
⊲
S
=
⋃
finite Σ⋆⊆Σ
CD:Σ
⋆
⊲
S
; the proofs of the other halves of [A] and [B] are analogous. Take
Γ1 ∪ {A} ⊆ L and suppose A ∈ C
D:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ1), that is, Γ1 ⊲
S Σ ∪ {A}. As ⊲S is finitary, there
must exist finite sets Γ⋆
1
⊆ Γ1 and ∆
⋆ ⊆ ∆ such that Γ⋆
1
⊲
S ∆⋆ ∪ {A}. This means that
A ∈ CD:Σ
⋆
⊲
S
(Γ⋆
1
). But we also know from Prop. 3.1(1) & (2) that CD:Σ
⋆
⊲
S
(Γ⋆
1
) ⊆ CD:Σ
⊲
S
(Γ⋆
1
)
and CD:Σ
⋆
⊲
S
(Γ⋆
1
) ⊆ CD:Σ
⋆
⊲
S
(Γ1), and we reach thereby the envisaged conclusions.
Assume now that [A] and [B] both hold good, and take Π,Σ ⊆ L such that Π ⊲S Σ.
IfΠ∪Σ is finite we are done. Otherwise, eitherΠ or Σ is infinite, and hence non-empty.
In case Π , ∅, let A ∈ Π. Clearly, we have {A} ∪ Π ⊲S Σ and so A ∈ CA:Π
⊲
S
(Σ). Using
[A] and [B], we see that there must exist finite sets Π⋆ ⊆ Π and Σ⋆ ⊆ Σ such that
A ∈ CA:Π
⋆
⊲
S
(Σ⋆). Therefore, we have {A} ∪Π⋆ ⊲S Σ⋆. The case where Σ , ∅ is checked
analogously. 
It should be clear, in view of the latter result, that finitariness of S-consequence
must be witnessed both from the viewpoint of axioms / anti-axioms and from the view-
point of background asserted / denied assumptions. This observation will be made
particularly relevant later on, in Prop. 3.5.
Taking advantage of the previous results, we may say that each S-consequence
relation ⊲ ⊆ ℘(L) × ℘(L) induces a certain operator C2⊲ : ℘(L) × ℘(L) −→ ℘(L) ×
℘(L) by setting C2⊲ (Π,Σ) :=
(
CD:Σ
⊲
(Π) ,CA:Π
⊲
(Σ)
)
. The following properties are now
immediate to check:
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Proposition 3.3. Let ⊲ be an S-consequence relation on L, and let Π,Σ ⊆ L. Then, we
have:
(1) C2⊲ is a closure operator on the partially ordered structure 〈℘(L) × ℘(L),⊆〉.
(2) C2⊲(Π,Σ) =
⋂
Ω⊆L such that (Ω,Ω)⊇ (Π,Σ)
C2⊲(Ω,Ω).
(3) Either C2⊲(Ω,Ω) = (Ω,Ω) or C2⊲(Ω,Ω) = (L,L).
Proof. Concerning item (1), note that properties (COT0) and (COT1) follow from
Prop. 3.1(1) and property (COT2) follows from Prop. 3.1(5). Item (2) follows from
Prop. 3.1(4), and item (3) follows from Prop. 3.1(3). 
The above properties suggest the following abstract ‘bilateralist’ definition, si-
multaneously generalizing the purely assertion-based and the purely denial-based T-
consequence operators associated to a givenS-consequence relation. AnS-consequence
operator on L is defined as a mapping C2 : ℘(L) × ℘(L) −→ ℘(L)× ℘(L) that satisfies,
for every Γ0, Γ1,∆0,∆1 ⊆ L:
(COS0) C2(Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ C2(Γ1 ∪ ∆1, Γ0 ∪ ∆0)
(COS1) (Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ C2(Γ1, Γ0)
(COS2) C2(C2(Γ1, Γ0)) ⊆ C2(Γ1, Γ0)
(COS3) C2(Γ1, Γ0) ⊇
⋂
Ω⊆L such that (Ω,Ω)⊇ (Γ1,Γ2)
C2⊲(Ω,Ω)
Properties (COS0), (COS1) and (COS2) are precisely those required to make C2 a
closure operator on 〈℘(L)×℘(L),⊆〉. They are clearly not sufficient, though, to capture
the intimate dependencies between the thereby involved assertions and denials. As
it so happens, such dependencies are fully captured by property (COS3). The latter
property is so strong, however, that a simpler (though somewhat less familiar-looking)
characterization of S-consequence operators is now available:
Proposition 3.4. The mapping C2 : ℘(L)×℘(L) −→ ℘(L)×℘(L) is an S-consequence
operator on L if and only if the following properties both hold:
(V) either C2(Ω,Ω) = (Ω,Ω) or C2(Ω,Ω) = (L,L), for every Ω ⊆ L
(T) C2(Γ1, Γ0) =
⋂
Ω⊆L such that
(Ω,Ω)⊇ (Γ1 ,Γ0) and C2(Ω,Ω), (L,L)
(Ω,Ω), for every Γ0, Γ1 ⊆ L
Proof. Let C2 be an S-consequence operator. In order to establish property (V), let
(Γ1, Γ0) := C2(Ω,Ω) and assume (Γ1, Γ0) , (Ω,Ω), for some Ω ⊆ L. By (COS1),
we conclude that (Ω,Ω) ( (Γ1, Γ0). Thus, either there exists some A ∈ Γ1 \ Ω, and
so A ∈ Ω ⊆ Γ0, or else there exists some A ∈ Γ0 \ Ω, and so A ∈ Ω ⊆ Γ1. In both
cases we see that Γ1 ∩ Γ0 , ∅. Hence, from (COS3) we know that (Γ1, Γ0) ⊇ (L,L),
for (Γ1, Γ0) contains the intersection of an empty family of elements of ℘(L) × ℘(L),
and from this it follows that Γ0 = Γ1 = L. Now, concerning property (T), note in
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particular that (COS3) guarantees its right-to-left inclusion, in view of (V) and the
fact that (Γ1, Γ0) ∩ (L,L) = (Γ1, Γ0). For the converse inclusion, note that if there is
some Ω ⊆ L such that (Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) then (COS0) guarantees that C2(Γ1, Γ0) ⊆
C2(Ω,Ω). Further knowing that C2(Ω,Ω) , (L,L), we may now use (V) to conclude
that C2(Ω,Ω) = (Ω,Ω). Therefore, C2(Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ (Ω,Ω), and property (T) follows.
Conversely, assume now thatC2 satisfies (V) and (T). Since (Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ (Γ1∪Γ
′
1
, Γ0∪
Γ′
0
) it is clear that (Γ1 ∪ Γ
′
1
, Γ0 ∪ Γ
′
0
) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) implies (Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ (Ω,Ω). Property (T)
then guarantees that C2(Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ C2(Γ1 ∪ Γ
′
1
, Γ0 ∪ Γ
′
0
), and property (COS0) thus
holds. Note that (COS1) follows easily from (T) since the intersection is over pairs
(Ω,Ω) with (Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ (Ω,Ω). Concerning property (COS2), and using (T) again, it
suffices to note that if (Γ,∆) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) then (COS0) and (V) tell us that C2(Γ1, Γ0) ⊆
C2(Ω,Ω) = (Ω,Ω). Finally, property (COS3) follows directly from (T), given that
(Γ1, Γ0) ∩ (L,L) = (Γ1, Γ0) and that property (V) states that if C2(Ω,Ω) , (L,L) then
C2(Ω,Ω) = (Ω,Ω). 
It is worth noticing that (COS2) had no role to play in proving the first part of the
latter result. Indeed, we have just checked in the course of the full proof of that result
that (COS2) follows from (COS0), (COS1) and (COS3); as a matter of fact, we have
only included it in the definition of S-consequence operators for the sake of producing
a more familiar-looking definition — one that would be more easily comparable to the
earlier, and standard, definition of T-consequence operators.
As one would surely expect, an S-consequence operator C2 will be called finitary
when it satisfies the following property, for every Γ0, Γ1 ⊆ L:
(COSF) C2(Γ1, Γ0) ⊆
⋃
finite Γ⋆
1
⊆ Γ1
finite Γ⋆
0
⊆ Γ0
C2(Γ⋆
1
, Γ⋆
0
).
Proposition 3.5. An S-consequence relation ⊲ is finitary if and only if C2⊲ is finitary.
Proof. The result is immediate from the definition of the S-consequence operator C2⊲
induced by ⊲, and by property (COSF), if we observe that properties [A] and [B] of
Prop. 3.2 are jointly equivalent to requiring for all Γ1, Γ0 ⊆ L that both C
D:Γ0
⊲
(Γ1) ⊆⋃
finite Γ⋆
1
⊆ Γ1
finite Γ⋆
0
⊆ Γ0
C
D:Γ⋆
0
⊲
(Γ⋆
1
) and C
A:Γ1
⊲
(Γ0) ⊆
⋃
finite Γ⋆
1
⊆ Γ1
finite Γ⋆
0
⊆ Γ0
C
A:Γ⋆
1
⊲
(Γ⋆
0
). 
We shall end the present section by showing that the newly introduced S-conse-
quence operators are closely associated to S-consequence relations, in precisely the
same way as it was known to happen with T-consequence. To that effect, we will say
that an S-consequence operator C2 induces a certain binary relation ⊲C2 on ℘(L) by
setting Π ⊲C2 Σ iff C2(Π,Σ) = (L,L).
Proposition 3.6. Let C2 be an S-consequence operator, and ⊲ be an S-consequence
relation, both on L. We have that:
(1) ⊲C2 is an S-consequence relation on L.
(2) ⊲C2⊲= ⊲ and C2⊲C2 = C2.
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(3) ⊲C2 is finitary if and only if C2 is finitary.
Proof. We prove each of the above statemens, in turn:
(1) Concerning (CRS0), given Π ⊲C2 Σ we have C2(Π,Σ) = (L,L) and from that we
conclude using (COS0) that C2(Π∪Π
′,Σ∪Σ′) = (L,L), and soΠ′∪Π ⊲C2 Σ∪Σ
′.
As for property (CRS1), if Π∩ Σ , ∅, then by invoking (T) with the intersection
of an empty family of elements of ℘(L) we conclude that C2(Π,Σ) = (L,L), and
so Π ⊲C2 Σ. Finally, concerning (CRS2), suppose that Ω ∪ Π ⊲C2 Σ ∪ Ω, that is,
C2(Π ∪ Ω,Σ ∪ Ω) = (L,L), for every Ω ⊆ L. In that case, given (Π,Σ) ⊆ (L,L)
the said hypothesis amounts more simply to C2(Ω,Ω) = (L,L). But then (T)
immediately gives us C2(Π,Σ) = (L,L), that is, Π ⊲C2 Σ.
(2) We prove first that ⊲C2⊲= ⊲. Note that Π ⊲C2⊲ Σ iff C2⊲(Π,Σ) = (L,L), by
definition of the S-consequence relation induced by the S-consequence opera-
tor C2⊲, and recall that C2⊲ (Π,Σ) =
(
CD:Σ
⊲
(Π),CA:Π
⊲
(Σ)
)
, by definition of the S-
consequence operator induced by the S-consequence relation ⊲. Thus, Π ⊲C2⊲ Σ
iff CD:Σ
⊲
(Π) = L = CA:Π
⊲
(Σ) iff [a] both Π ⊲ Σ ∪ {A} and {A} ∪ Π ⊲ Σ for every
A ∈ L. On the one hand, taking ∆ = {A} in (CRS2), we may conclude from [a]
that Π ⊲ Σ. On the other hand, from Π ⊲ Σ we may obtain [a] by using (CRS0).
We show next that C2⊲C2 = C2. Unravelling the definitions, we may say that
C2⊲C2(Π,Σ) = (T1, T0), where T1 := {A ∈ L : C2(Π,Σ ∪ {A}) = (L,L)} and
T0 := {A ∈ L : C2(Π ∪ {A},Σ) = (L,L)}. In view of (T) and (V), it would
suffice to prove that C2(Π,Σ ∪ {A}) = (L,L) if and only if A ∈ Ω follows from
assuming both (Π,Σ) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) and C2(Ω,Ω) , (L,L), for any given Ω ⊆ L,
as well as to prove an analogous result concerning C2(Π ∪ {A},Σ) = (L,L) and
A ∈ Ω. We shall check in detail just the first stated equivalence. Assume first
that [b] (Π,Σ) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) and [c] C2(Ω,Ω) , (L,L), for an arbitrary Ω ⊆ L, and
suppose that [d] C2(Π,Σ ∪ {A}) = (L,L). From [d] and [b], it follows from (T)
that A < Ω, on the pain of contradicting [c], and so we conclude that A ∈ Ω.
Next, suppose that C2(Π,Σ∪ {A}) , (L,L). From (T) we may then conclude that
[e] C2(Ω,Ω) , (L,L) for some Ω ⊆ L such that [f] (Π,Σ ∪ {A}) ⊆ (Ω,Ω). But
from [f] it follows that both [g] (Π,Σ) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) and [h] A ∈ Ω are the case. Note
that [h] means that A < Ω, in spite of both [e] and [g] being the case.
(3) This follows from Prop. 3.5, using the fact that C2⊲C2 = C2, proved in item
(2). 
The above result makes it evident that, in a precise sense, choosing to work with S-
consequence relations or with S-consequence operators is just a matter of convenience
— we have just seen that there is a dual isomorphism between the lattice CRLS(L)
of S-consequence relations on L and the lattice COLS(L) defined by the set of all S-
consequence operators on L equipped with the inclusion ordering, generalizing the
already mentioned corresponding well-known result concerning T-consequence; we
have also seen that the result carries over to the finitary case. Incidentally, insofar
as convenience is involved, in the next section we will see that the newly introduced
notion of S-consequence operator allows one in fact to entertain a generalized notion
of ‘theory’ that manages to treat denials on a par with assertions.
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4 Generalizing the spaces of theories
As mentioned in Section 1, the standard space of all theories of a given T-consequence
relation ⊲T has the structure of a complete lattice under inclusion. It allows one to
study the connections between different sets of axioms, or hypotheses, added on top
of a given logic, and the corresponding collections of theorems thereby generated, or
whereby concluded. This is fully adequate, we admit, as long as one is interested, say,
in seeing how the acceptance of certain judgments commit an agent to accepting other
judgments (or, dually, in seeing how the rejection of certain judgments leads an agent to
rejecting other judgments). In the present paper, though, we are interested in analyzing
the behavior of theories containing both assertions and denials. We want to impose no
preference on acceptance over rejection, nor vice-versa, and want to consider instead
theories that allow an agent to take either attitude with respect to given judgments, that
is, theories that allow an agent to assert some sentences while simultaneously denying
other sentences. As we shall argue and illustrate, such a setting demonstrably conveys
a greater expressive power for defining and reasoning about theories.
Given an S-consequence relation ⊲ on L, a set Γ1 ⊆ L of axioms and a set Γ0 ⊆ L
of anti-axioms, we call C2⊲(Γ1, Γ0) the ⊲-theory-pair axiomatized by (Γ1, Γ0). Where
(T1, T0) := C2⊲(Γ1, Γ0), we call the elements of T1 the theorems and call the elements
of T0 the anti-theorems of the given ⊲-theory-pair. We say that the pair (Γ1, Γ0) is
⊲-consistent if C2⊲(Γ1, Γ0) , (L,L), and ⊲-inconsistent otherwise.
Lemma 4.1. Let ⊲ be an S-consequence relation on L and let (T1, T0) be the ⊲-theory-
pair axiomatized by (Γ1, Γ0) ∈ ℘(L) × ℘(L). The following properties are equivalent:
[a] (Γ1, Γ0) is ⊲-inconsistent
[b] T1 ∩ T0 , ∅
[c] Γ1 ⊲ Γ0
Proof. [a] implies [b]: If (Γ1, Γ0) is ⊲-inconsistent then T1 = T0 = L = T0 ∩ T1. To
round off, just recall that we always assume L to be non-empty. [b] implies [c]: If
A ∈ T0 ∩ T1 then we have both Γ1 ⊲ Γ0 ∪ {A} and {A} ∪ Γ1 ⊲ Γ0. Given an arbitrary
Ω ⊆ L, note that (Γ1, Γ0) * (Ω,Ω) implies Ω ∪ Γ1 ⊲ Γ0 ∪ Ω, in view of (CRS1), while
(Γ1, Γ0) ⊆ (Ω,Ω) implies Ω ∪ Γ1 ⊲ Γ0 ∪ Ω by case analysis over A ∈ Ω and A < Ω,
in view of (CRS0). So, by using (CRS2) we conclude that Γ1 ⊲ Γ0. [c] implies [a]: If
Γ1 ⊲ Γ0 then (CRS0) guarantees that Γ1 ⊲ Γ0 ∪ {A} and {A} ∪ Γ1 ⊲ Γ0 for each A ∈ L.
Thus T1 = T0 = L and (Γ1, Γ0) is ⊲-inconsistent. 
For a givenS-consequence relation⊲wewill use ThS(⊲) := {C2⊲(Γ1, Γ0) : Γ0, Γ1 ⊆
L} to refer to the space of all ⊲-theory-pairs. As C2⊲ is a closure operator, it fol-
lows that ThS(⊲) equipped with the component-wise inclusion ordering constitutes a
complete lattice, appropriately generalizing thus the situation for T-consequence re-
lations and thereby associated T-consequence operators. The phenomena illustrated
in Section 2 according to which T-consequence relations in general fail absoluteness
and also may in general be associated to several distinct S-consequence relations have
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indicated that the traditional study of T-consequence falls short in providing a full un-
derstanding of S-consequence. In contrast, it is clear that ⊲-theory-pairs provide a
full-fledged generalization of the notion of theory for T-consequence. Indeed, given an
S-consequence relation ⊲S on L, the first component of the pair C2
⊲
S(Γ1,∅) amounts
precisely to the assertion-based theory C
⊲
T
⊲
S
(Γ1), while the second component con-
tains all anti-theorems that follow according to ⊲S in the context of taking Γ1 as back-
ground asserted assumptions; the situation is entirely dual with respect to C2
⊲
S(∅, Γ0),
the denial-based theory C
⊲
S⊲
T(Γ0) that constitutes its second component and its corre-
sponding first component consisting of anti-theorems that follow according to ⊲S in
the context of taking Γ0 as background denied assumptions. Note that ⊲-theory-pairs
can go much beyond these particular cases, however, as they allow one to deal with
theorems and anti-theorems that result from simultaneously taking both sets of axioms
and anti-axioms as non-empty.
It is worth looking at theory-pairs in the light of the semantic results of Section 2.
Given a canonical semantics V ⊆ {0, 1}L, let’s use C2V to denote C2⊲V . For anyΩ ⊆ L,
we have that C2V(Ω,Ω) , (L,L) if and only if Ω ◮V Ω if and only if (Ω,Ω) = (1ν, 0ν)
for some ν ∈ V. Consequently, also generalizing the traditional setting, we have:
C2V(Γ1, Γ0) =
⋂
ν∈V such that (1ν,0ν)⊇ (Γ1 ,Γ0)
(1ν, 0ν). (⋆⋆)
It should be clear that the pairs (1ν, 0ν) with ν ∈ V are not only fixed points of C2,
but they actually constitute precisely the maximal theory-pairs of ThS(⊲V), in the sense
that they are⊲V-consistent but their only proper extension is the inconsistent pair (L,L).
Note also that here the absoluteness ofS-consequence has the effect of making ThS(⊲V)
unique, for here each valuation has a ‘countermodelling’ role to play.
Recall that the standard notion of theory as a ‘closed set of sentences’ is deeply con-
nected to a closure operator ⊲ in the following sense: the fixed points of the closure op-
erator C⊲ identify precisely the sets of sentences that contain all of its T-consequences,
that is, if there is some Γ ∈ ℘(L) such that T = C⊲(Γ), then T ⊲ A iff A ∈ T , in view
of (CRT2) and (CRT1). This is now easily seen to generalize to our novel bilateralist
notion of closure:
Proposition 4.2. Let ⊲S be an S-consequence relation. If there is some (Γ1, Γ0) ∈
℘(L) × ℘(L) such that (T1, T0) = C2⊲S(Γ1, Γ0), then: [a] T1 ⊲ T0 ∪ {A} iff A ∈ T1 and
[b] {A} ∪ T1 ⊲ T0 iff A ∈ T0.
Proof. Recall from Section 3 that C2
⊲
S (Γ1, Γ0) :=
(
C
D:Γ0
⊲
S
(Γ1) ,C
A:Γ1
⊲
S
(Γ0)
)
. Thus, given
that T1 is taken here as the set C
D:Γ0
⊲
S
(Γ1), we may invoke Prop. 3.1(1) to conclude that
T1 = C
D:T0
⊲
S
(T1), which means precisely that A ∈ T1 if and only if T1 ⊲ T0 ∪ {A}, as
stated in item [a]. The proof of item [b] is analogous. 
The latter result fully supports the intuition that led us to upgrade the view of a theory
as a closed set of a ‘unilateralist’ closure operator, which has a bias exclusively towards
assertion (or, dually, exclusively towards denial), into a more generous framework in
which we look for closed set-pairs (pairs of sentences that satisfy items [a] and [b] in
the statement of the above proposition) to fit our generalized notion of closure, which
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takes both assertions and denials equally into consideration. It is worth indeed pointing
out that, as in the case of T-consequence, the bilateralist S-consequence operators are
uniquely determined by their associated spaces of theories.
We shall now briefly revisit the first specific illustration from Section 2, that of
the S-consequence relation for the implication-only fragment of classical propositional
logic, to show how the present notion of theory-pair provides a framework for the study
of consequence that is strictly more expressive than the received one-sided standard
notion of theory. Let ⊲S be the mentioned S-consequence relation and ⊲T
⊲
S
be the
thereby induced T-consequence relation. Let q ∈ P be a propositional variable, and
consider the ⊲-theory-pair (T1, T0) := C2⊲S(∅, {q}). Using the above characterization
of C2V, it is clear that such ⊲-theory-pair is semantically characterized by taking V as
the set of all Boolean valuations ν such that ν(q) = 0. Hence, it follows in particular
that T1 = C⊲T({q → A : A ∈ L}). The present theoretical framework for S-consequence
has, in this case, two clear advantages. First, note that it still allows one to obtain T0 as
the set of all sentences evaluated to 0 by all Boolean valuations ν ∈ V such that ν(q) =
0. Second, we claim that T1 simply cannot be finitely axiomatized as a ⊲
T-theory
(recall that negation is not expressible in the implication-only fragment of classical
propositional logic), that is, for every finite Ψ ⊆ L we have C
⊲
T(Ψ) , T1. To see this,
given a finite Ψ ⊆ L take any variable r , q in P such that r does not occur in the
sentences in Ψ; let ν be the canonical bivaluation such that ν(r) = 0 and ν(p) = 1 if
p , r; then, it is immediate to see that Ψ ⊆ 1v yet ν(q→ r) = 0.
We will close this section with a result that further reinforces the adequacy of our
present novel notion of theory-pair for S-consequence relations. As we have seen in
the final illustration of Section 2, it may happen that the T-consequence relation ⊲T
⊲
S
is
finitary even when the S-consequence relation that induces it is not finitary. It is well-
known (cf. Theorem 1.3.5 of [23]) however, that a T-consequence relation is finitary
precisely when its space of theories is ‘closed under ultraproducts’. This suggests that
T-consequence fails somehow in capturing all the nuances of S-consequence. Nonethe-
less, we can now show that the mentioned result concerning closure under ultrafilters
may be generalized in a very natural way with the help of ⊲S-theory-pairs.
For immediate subsequent use, we briefly recall a couple of standard definitions
and facts (cf., e.g., [4]). Given a set I, an ultrafilter on I is a set U ⊆ ℘(I) satisfying
the following conditions: (U1) ∅ < U; (U2) if X ∈ U and X ⊆ Y then Y ∈ U;
(U3) if X, Y ∈ U then X ∩ Y ∈ U; (U4) if X ⊆ I, then either X ∈ U or I \ X ∈ U.
Further,W ⊆ ℘(I) is said to enjoy the finite intersection property if every finite subset
{X1, . . . , Xn} ⊆ W is such that X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn , ∅. It is useful to bear in mind that the
Ultrafilter Lemma states that for everyW ⊆ ℘(I) with the finite intersection property
there exists an ultrafilter U such that W ⊆ U. Finally, the ultraproductÆU(T ) of a
familyT := {(Πi,Σi)}i∈I ⊆ ℘(L)×℘(L)modulo an ultrafilterU on I is the pair (ΠU,ΣU)
with ΠU = {A ∈ L : {i ∈ I : A ∈ Πi} ∈ U} and ΣU = {A ∈ L : {i ∈ I : A ∈ Σi} ∈ U}.
Lemma 4.3. Let ⊲ be an S-consequence relation on L, let T := {(Πi,Σi)}i∈I ⊆ ℘(L) ×
℘(L), and let U be an ultrafilter on I. If (Πi,Σi) is ⊲-consistent for each i ∈ I then
ÆU(T ) is ⊲-consistent.
Proof. Suppose thatÆU(T ) is ⊲-inconsistent, that is, (ΓU,∆U) = (L,L). Take A ∈ L.
This means that {i ∈ I : A ∈ Πi} ∈ U and {i ∈ I : A ∈ Σi} ∈ U, and therefore also
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{i ∈ I : A ∈ Πi and A ∈ Σi} = {i ∈ I : A ∈ Πi} ∩ {i ∈ I : A ∈ Σi} ∈ U and hence
{i ∈ I : A ∈ Πi and A ∈ Σi} , ∅. Thus, Πi ∩ Σi , ∅ for some i ∈ I and, by Lemma 4.1,
(Πi,Σi) is ⊲-inconsistent. 
Proposition 4.4. Let ⊲ be an S-consequence relation on L. Then, ⊲ is finitary if and
only if ThS(⊲) is closed under ultraproducts.
Proof. Assume that ⊲ is a finitary S-consequence relation. LetU be an ultrafilter on I,
and consider a family T := {(Xi, Yi)}i∈I ⊆ Th
S(⊲), that is, for each i ∈ I, assume
that there exist Πi,Σi ⊆ L such that Xi = C
D:Σi
⊲
(Πi) and Yi = C
A:Πi
⊲
(Σi). To show that
(ΠU,ΣU) := ÆU(T ) is in Th
S(⊲), we have to find Π,Σ ⊆ L such that ΠU = C
D:Σ
⊲
(Π)
and ΣU = C
A:Π
⊲
(Σ). The obvious candidate for playing the role of such pair (Π,Σ) is
(ΠU,ΣU) itself, and we claim indeed that the ultraproduct (ΠU,ΣU) is a closed set-
pair of ⊲. Let A ∈ L and suppose first that ΠU ⊲ ΣU ∪ {A}. As ⊲ is finitary, there
exist finite sets Π⋆ := {B1, . . . , Bn} ⊆ ΠU and Σ
⋆ := {C1, . . . ,Cm} ⊆ ΣU such that
Π⋆ ⊲ Σ⋆ ∪ {A}, for some n,m ∈ IN. Set IBk := {i ∈ I : Bk ∈ Πi}, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
and set ICk := {i ∈ I : Ck ∈ Σi}, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. By the definitions of ΠU and ΣU
it is clear that IBk ∈ U, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and ICk ∈ U, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Setting
ID := IB1 ∩ · · · ∩ IBn ∩ IC1 ∩ · · · ∩ ICm , by (U3) we may conclude that ID ∈ U. Let
i ∈ ID. This amounts to assuming Π
⋆ ⊆ Xi and Σ
⋆ ⊆ Yi. So, in view of Π
⋆
⊲ Σ⋆ ∪ {A}
we may use (CRS0) to conclude that Xi ⊲ Yi ∪ {A}. We may then use Prop. 4.2[a] to
conclude that A ∈ Xi. It follows that ID ⊆ {i ∈ I : A ∈ Xi}, which implies by (U2) that
{i ∈ I : A ∈ Xi} ∈ U, and so we see that A ∈ ΠU. The proof that {A} ∪ ΠU ⊲ ΣU
implies A ∈ ΣU is analogous.
Conversely, assume now that ThS(⊲) is closed under ultraproducts, consider ar-
bitrary Π,Σ ⊆ L, and suppose Π⋆ ◮ Σ⋆ for all finite Π⋆ ⊆ Π and Σ⋆ ⊆ Σ. Set
I := {(Π⋆,Σ⋆) : finite Π⋆ ⊆ Π, finite Σ⋆ ⊆ Σ} and set W := {•i : i ∈ I}, where
•i := {J ⊆ I : i ∈ J}. As a finite union of finite sets is still finite, it is straightfor-
ward to see that W enjoys the finite intersection property, and thus, by the Ultrafilter
Lemma, there exists an ultrafilter U on I that contains W. Consider now the fam-
ily T := {(Πi,Σi)}i∈I , where (Πi,Σi) := C2⊲(i) for each i ∈ I. Note that each such
(Πi,Σi) is a ⊲-consistent theory-pair, by hypothesis. By assumption, the ultraproduct
(ΠU,ΣU) :=ÆU(T ) is in Th
S(⊲), and is ⊲-consistent as a consequence of Lemma 4.3.
Hence, Lemma 4.1 implies that ΠU ◮ ΣU . We claim that (Π,Σ) ⊆ (ΠU,ΣU). Indeed,
if A ∈ Π then •({A},∅) ∈ U, so •({A},∅) ⊆ {i ∈ I : A ∈ Πi} and by (U2) it follows that
{i ∈ I : A ∈ Πi} ∈ U, from which we conclude that A ∈ ΠU; the proof that Σ ⊆ ΣU is
analogous. Using (CM0), we conclude then from (Π,Σ) ⊆ (ΠU,ΣU) that Π ◮ Σ. 
What should follow?
David Hilbert once defended the axiomatic method as essential in providing a “defini-
tive presentation and complete logical assurance of the content of our knowledge”
(cf. [9]). Nowadays, axiomatically presented theories are commonplace, both in Math-
ematics and in Science. Logics, in particular, have often been presented through con-
sequence relations induced by sets of axioms. For that purpose, nonetheless, sets of
anti-axioms could equally be used, though perhaps the force of habit has made such
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alternative approach much less prevalent. While it is true that classical logic and intu-
itionistic logic disagree on what should count as theorems, they agree on what should
count as anti-theorems (for an anti-axiomatization of classical propositional logic, see
[16]). As long as one delves further into non-classical territory, however, situations in
which anti-theorems play a more important role than theorems start to look just as nat-
ural. The novel notion of a theory-pair explored in the present paper is flexible enough
to allow for the study of logics from either perspective, and even from both perspec-
tives at once. For a further natural step, from the model-theoretic viewpoint, it would
seem worth pursuing more investigations in the line of [1], concerning the characteri-
zation “in purely mathematical terms” —in the sense of [22]— of classes of structures
presented not only in terms of collections of equations or of equality-free positive lit-
erals but also classes of structures whose presentations include negative literals, which
happen to be accommodated equally well within our present approach to consequence.
From the proof-theoretic viewpoint, it is usual to consider sets of sentences en-
dowed with an algebraic structure and to demand the underlying notion of consequence
to be ‘substitution-invariant’, that is, to assume that Π ⊲ Σ implies σ(Π) ⊲ σ(Σ) for
any endomorphism σ on L. Semantically, in order to properly cope with substitution-
invariance, one often considers richer interpretation structures such as ‘logical ma-
trices’, as in [6] and [24], rather than bivaluations. Such an enrichment would not
really bring added complexity to the hereby proposed notion of space of theories for
S-consequence relations. It is worth pointing out, at any rate, that the consequence
operators CD:Σ
⊲
S
or CA:Π
⊲
S
are not necessarily substitution-invariant even when ⊲S is, in
view of the fixed background assertions or denials. Deductively, the richer structure of
S-consequence relations is no longer compatible with the modest design that is char-
acteristic of Hilbert-style calculi. Several alternatives are at hand, though, including of
course Gentzen-like sequent calculi, but a simpler adequate possibility is just to con-
sider a generalization of Hilbert-style calculi whose rules contain sets of premises and
sets of conclusions, as in [19] and [13].
As we have pointed out above, exactly like the space of theories associated to
a given T-consequence relation, the space of theory-pairs associated to a given S-
consequence relation also forms a complete lattice — as expected, meets are given
by (component-wise) intersections of theory-pairs, and joins correspond to the closure
of (component-wise) unions of theory-pairs. We believe it would be interesting to in-
vestigate the distributivity of these lattices of theories, namely by looking for sufficient
conditions such as the existence of appropriate disjunction connectives in the case of
T-consequence (cf. [15]). We expect such a study to further enlighten the dissimilari-
ties between S-consequence and T-consequence, well patent in the fact that the lattice
of all S-consequence relations is always distributive, whereas that is not the case for
the lattice of all T-consequence relations (cf. §1.17 of [10]). In the same spirit, many
other aspects of the spaces of theory-pairs would seem worth investigating. We have
for instance shown that finitary S-consequence relations correspond precisely to those
relations whose spaces of theory-pairs are closed under ultraproducts, generalizing the
well-known result for finitary T-consequence relations; given that the latter are also
known to correspond to those relations whose spaces of theories are ‘inductive’, i.e.
those that contain the union of upward directed families (cf. §1.3.3 & 1.3.5 of [23]),
it would of course be only natural to look for a generalization of such inductiveness
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condition in the context of S-consequence.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the present investigation has all been done
from the perspective of the smoothest possible generalization of the received (Tarskian-
inspired) notion of consequence. As soon as one entertains the possibility of a notion
of compatibility that allows either for gappy or for glutty reasoning, the corresponding
notion of theory and the associated space of theories will have to be suitably adapted.
A general framework allowing for non-Tarskian notions of consequence that are char-
acterized by non-canonical valuations referring to more than two logical values is set
up in [2]. Extending our present foray into the land of theories towards covering many-
dimensional notions of entailment looks like a natural plan of attack for the future.
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